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Science without Laws? Model Building, Micro Histo-
ries and the Fate of the Theory of Fertility Decline 
Mikołaj Szołtysek ∗ 
Abstract: The present article takes stock of older and new-
est research on fertility decline in order to determine the 
present perspective of historical demography. By referring 
to different approaches to the development of scientific re-
search programmes, the attempt is made to ascertain 
whether the historical studies of fertility change are on the 
way from a progressive stage to one in which researchers 
are increasingly forced to respond to an ever-growing list of 
counter-examples and nuances. In this context the reconsid-
eration of the demographic transition, as is has been formu-
lated by the Princeton-group, plays a central role. It has 
been for a long time the point of reference of all historical 
demographic research. The implication of this theory and its 
scientific discussion are outlined in their main aspects (in-
novation, stopping behaviour, cultural explanation, macrop-
erspective) and confronted with the countervailing evi-
dence. The Princeton-model has not totally disappeared as a 
point of reference, but there is a clear tendency towards a 
proliferation of discourses, so that one wonders, if affirma-
tion of heterogeneity is not the only way to generalize in 
historical demography. In contrast the article pleads for a 
reinforced effort in the domain of theory to get out of the 
epistemological crisis of the discipline. 
 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Mikołaj Szołtysek, Cambridge Group for the History of 
Population and Social Structure, Department of Geography, Sir William Hardy Building, 
Downing Place, Cambridge, CB2 3EN, UK; e-mail: ms703@cam.ac.uk.  
Author’s note: I am grateful to Sheilagh Ogilvie, Simon Szreter, Richard Smith, Alice Reid, 
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Instead of approach towards consensus, there has been a proliferation of 
theoretical statements, many identified with one or a few persons or ‘schools’ 
of demography (or, increasingly, of methodology), and typically with strong 
emphasis on one variable or variable set (economics, culture, family plan-
ning) as a central or fundamental to fertility decline. Confrontation rather 
than synthesis seems the order of the day. (T.K. Burch 1996: 60) 
 
Three decades ago, there was wide consensus on why fertility falls. Now, 
however, it seems that the closer we get to understanding specific fertility de-
clines, the further we move from a general theory of fertility transition. 
(S. Greenhalgh 1990: 85) 
 
Changes in reproductive patterns and the spread of a deliberate control of 
fertility due to the so-called demographic transition have been among the cen-
tral focuses of the research within post-war historical demography. The ques-
tion whether marital fertility both in past European populations and in their 
contemporary Third World counterparts could have been intentionally manipu-
lated constituted a sort of “meta-theme” for much of historical demography and 
population studies well into 1980s (Hirschman 1994; Friedlander, Okun and 
Segal 1999)1. Whether perceived as a sociological “grand theory” with revolu-
tionary implications or something that fulfills the claims of Merton’s middle-
range theory, or simply as one of the best-documented generalizations in the 
social sciences (Cowgill 1963; Kirk 1996: 361, 383; McDonald 2001), the 
concept of the demographic transition embodied the very nature of demography 
as a social science (Caldwell 1996, 2000; Burch 2000: 2; McDonald 2001:1). 
However, for the last two decades fertility-focused research has faced deci-
sive reformulations of the state of the art. It has also confronted the challenges 
to almost all its initial presumptions, models and theories. Independently of 
methodological progress, this critical process has been accompanied by an 
extensive accumulation of detailed empirical knowledge about particular re-
gions and locations which has emphasized localized cultural, economic and 
environmental factors affecting family formation rules and couples’ reproduc-
tive decisions in a variety of ways. Unfortunately, this new evidence has been 
piling up faster than its theoretical implications could have been assimilated. 
What we have instead are increasingly micro-histories that stress the heteroge-
neity and diversity of historical phenomena that can hardly serve to build a 
                                                             
1  Historical demography as an independent discipline or as a recognisable sub-discipline of 
demography, is here defined in broad terms as that which applies demographic methods to 
the study of historical populations. To my knowledge, there is no existing in-depth study of 
historical demography’s disciplinary identity that goes beyond the pure description of its 
scope, methods and sources, and would tackle the issues of its epistemological nature. See: 
Henry 1968; Van de Walle and Kantrow 1974; Willigan and Lynch 1982. Comp. with Riley 
and McCarthy 2003 (ch. 3, 4, 5). 
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coherent theory of the past demographic and family processes. The task of 
accommodating the diversity of these historical paths into a common theoreti-
cal framework remains the most serious challenge for the field (Hirschman 
1994: 203; also Van de Kaa 1996: 390-391)2. It seems equally true, however, 
that rather than a lack of a proper theory of the fertility decline it has been a 
trend toward particularistic explanations that have caused the present confusion 
within fertility research (Burch 1996: 60-61). This proliferation of discourses, 
as it will turn out, is posing a serious threat to the disciplinary identity of his-
torical demographic studies that has been taken for granted by two generation 
of scholars. What I will seek to argue is that the prospects of the future histori-
cal fertility studies seem to be conditioned to a much greater extent upon a 
deeper theoretical reflection, than on the further empirical progress and techni-
cal advancement. Although some attempts have already been made to pursue 
that goal (McNicoll 1992; Hirschman 1994; Van de Kaa 1996; Mason 1997), 
the decisive epistemological and disciplinary questions have only been rarely 
raised (Riley and McCarthy 2003; Burch 1996, 2000; Lesthaeghe 1998; Lest-
haeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001). This essay seeks to find its own way to stimu-
late further the discussion of these issues.  
In Search of a better Explanatory Framework 
The increased capaciousness of discourses on fertility decline has been la-
mented so far by at least some of those involved in demographic research (be-
sides the authors of the opening quotations, see: Woods 1987: 283; van de 
Walle 1992: 487; Johansson 1993: 375; Alter 1992: 13; McNicoll 1992: 404; 
Hirschman 1994: 214; Mason 1997: 443). Various metaphors have been used 
to denote the proliferation of statements on the topic. In one of the most intel-
lectually appealing interpretive endeavors, the demographic transition theory is 
treated as a narrative told in different ways by different observers while debates 
surrounding the issue of the determinants of fertility behaviour are seen as the 
development of a series of sub-narratives from different disciplinary perspec-
tives and orientations (Van de Kaa 1996: 389 ff). Different parts of such sub-
narratives – so the argument goes – “have been highlighted at different times 
depending on policy interests, improvements in technical skills, availability of 
data, changes in societal settings, and the degree of satisfaction with the domi-
nant sub-narrative of the day” (Van de Kaa 1996: 389-390). The approach used 
by Van de Kaa, however, led him to overlook some important aspects of the 
problem. The approach used by Van de Kaa, however, led him to overlook 
some important aspects of the problem. Instead of treating different stories 
                                                             
2  T.K. Burch (2003) sees that process as related to the general lack of theory-driven research 
in demography. 
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about historical fertility transition as parts of a broader structure in which they 
constitute the deepest layer – as he ultimately did, following A. MacIntyre 
(1980, 1988: 354-364), my proposition would be to view them as the manifes-
tation of what can be termed an “epistemological crisis” of the discipline. Its 
proper understanding requires looking carefully at the disagreement that shat-
ters historical studies of fertility change and investigate that research field as 
the place where divergent and often incommensurable scientific discourses are 
increasingly clashing. 
MacIntyre has advanced a framework for the analysis of transformation of 
scientific traditions (MacIntyre 1988: 349-369) in which they are characterized 
by a recurrent developmental trajectory across three phases. In periods of sta-
bility – authority, texts, and beliefs have not yet been put into question, they 
simply offer the adherents of a given tradition a coherent knowledge system 
that enables them to investigate and explain the outer world. This phase resem-
bles T.Kuhn’s account of “normal science” which refers to the relatively rou-
tine work of scientists experimenting within a paradigm, but not actually chal-
lenging or attempting to test the underlying assumptions of that theory (Kuhn 
1970: 52). A discipline’s epistemological crisis emerges in the second phase 
when inadequacies and incoherencies are identified within the given tradition, 
partly due to the encounters with particular rival traditions, partly due to in-
creasing insufficiency of previously adhered concepts and theories in day-to-
day “puzzle-solving”. Hitherto trusted methods of enquiry become sterile and 
have the effect of disclosing new problems for the solving of which there seem 
to be no resources within the established fabric of belief (MacIntyre 1988: 355-
356, 361-362). This leads to the dissolution of historically founded certitudes 
within the discipline. Finally, in the third phase, necessary reformulations are 
identified within a tradition and its further conceptual development takes place. 
This happens owing to the operation of an imaginative conceptual innovation 
among the discipline’s adherents which enables them to invent new concepts 
and theories that furnish a solution to problems that had previously proved 
intractable.  
In the following sections, MacIntyre’s framework is taken as a starting point 
to review changes that have occurred in the perception of historical fertility 
decline, with the intention of exploring the nature and the sources of the present 
crisis of historical demography. Through an exploration of tensions and di-
lemmas that threat the study of history of reproductive change an attempt is 
made to discern the landscape of MacIntyre’s stage two of the major scientific 
tradition devoted to the understanding of the history of declining fertility3.  
                                                             
3  This essay is focused primarily on couples’ reproductive behaviours within pretransitional 
and transitional populations of historical Europe and America, with no attempt to investi-
gate the distinct although related subjects of epidemiological transition and contemporary 
fertility change in other parts of the world. It does seem, however, that the latter two topics 
face similar proliferation of discourses and may likely give birth to similar epistemological 
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From the Theory of Demographic Transition to the 
“Princeton Paradigm”: a “replacement effect”? 
An initial narrative, or – in our terms – the initial scientific tradition focused on 
the determinants of historical fertility behaviours is represented by the so-called 
Theory of the Demographic Transition as developed and formalized by Frank 
Notestein and his colleagues at the Office of Population Research in Princeton 
(Notestein 1945, 1953). The recognition of Notestein’s drawbacks in approach-
ing pretransitional reproductive behaviours and major correlates and causes of 
fertility decline led in the late 1950s and 1960s to the emergence of some early 
rival traditions and heterodox discourses4. They took the form of Davis and 
Blake’s socio-cultural framework for fertility analysis (1956), some early for-
mulations of an economic theory of fertility (Leibenstein 1957), Carlsson’s 
seminal distinction between adjustment and innovation in fertility change 
(1966), and Kingsley Davis’ theory of change and response (1963). As will be 
shown later on, some of these distinct approaches were to be then refreshed and 
reiterated in 1980s and 1990s.  
However, for the authors of the transition theory there was no more dramatic 
encounter than that with some of their own pupils and fellows. It was Ansley J. 
Coale, Notestein’s successor at the Princeton Office of Population Research 
who mobilized all the conceptual innovations available at that time to test the 
suppositions of his predecessors. Grounded on-time series data on fertility and 
modern computational facilities, the Princeton Project was to present a system-
atic collection of statistical data documenting fertility and related socio-
economic changes in several hundred provinces of Europe during periods of 
major fertility decline and to test the associations between specific indicators of 
modernization and fertility change. In fact, the impact of the Project on the 
                                                                                                                                
dilemmas. The literature surrounding the post World War II fertility decline in non-
European countries has been particularly rich and varied, and demographers are still far 
from achieving any kind of consensus on precisely which factors are reponsible for trigger-
ing and sustaining it (see Population and Development Review, Vol. 27, Supplement: 
Global Fertility Transition, 2001). As for the epidemiological and health transition issues, 
see Grundy 2005. My focus here is predominantly on the research published in English that 
has appeared between 1945 (Notestein’s formulation of the demographic transition) and the 
most recent years.  
4  The theory implied that: 1) transition takes a form of universal and linear process; (2) 
pretransitional high and uncontrolled fertility was socially and culturally legitimated re-
sponse to heavy mortality characteristic; (3) traditional cultural prescriptions favouring high 
fertility can be transformed by “the forces of modernization”; (4) during the early phase of 
the process fertility remained uncontrolled while mortality declined. The demographic tran-
sition theory was charged with being a grand historical generalization too broad and based 
on a variety of ad hoc assertions (see Leibenstein 1974: 460; also Hirschman 1994: 211). P. 
McDonald (2001) pointed to the theory’s incoherency with some of the crucial postwar and 
recent fertility phenomena. 
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status of the classic demographic transition theory was disruptive, even if it 
provided evidence both supportive as well unsupportive of it5. 
However, there is much more to say about the Project. It resembled fairly 
well a scientific community responsible for advancing what – in accordance 
with T. Kuhn – can be termed as a paradigm-based research6. Despite its inter-
national and cooperative character, the Project had a distinct and coherent 
scientific profile. It consists of demographers, statisticians and economists, but 
not historians. It used standarized scientific procedures (multivariate analysis of 
large scale aggregates; fertility indices) developed to test initial hypotheses in a 
formal and rigorous way. Many of its members followed a similar educational 
path7. The Project also had a common institutional background rooted mainly 
in American universities and was headquartered at Princeton’s Office of Popu-
lation Research having at its disposal resources acquired from the largest 
American foundations. During its 23-year research program (1963-1986) the 
Project published several books and many articles, all designed alongside com-
parable modes of representation (i.a. Coale and Watkins 1986; Coale, Ander-
                                                             
5  The Princeton findings revealing that, generally, the declines in crude death rates and crude 
birth rates looked like stage two of the classic theory, and suggesting that prior to general 
fertility decline family limitation was largely absent did not depart very much from 
Notestein’s original statement. More important, however, were the arguments that, overall, 
pre-transition fertility was lower than expected, fertility fell before mortality in some con-
texts and that the correlations between modernization and onset of fertility and mortality 
decline were weak; see Coale 1973; Coale and Watkins 1986. 
6  Paradigms as “exemplars” referred to particular, concrete achievements that defined the 
course of all subsequent research in a scientific discipline. Paradigms as “disciplinary ma-
trices” refer to an entire theoretical, methodological, and evaluative framework within 
which scientists conduct their research. This framework constitutes the basic assumptions 
of the discipline about how research in that discipline should be conducted as well as what 
constitutes a good scientific explanation. Kuhn believed scientific communities to be the 
communities of scholars centred around common scientific authorities, united by education, 
professional interaction and communication, as well as similar interests in problems of a 
certain sort and acceptance of a particular range of possible solutions to such problems 
(Kuhn 1970: 174-210; also Masterman 1970: 59-90). It must, however, be admitted here 
that interviews I carried out during 2006 (research grant from the Polish Science Founda-
tion) with some of the previous members of the PEFP (R. Lesthaeghe, J. Knodel, S.  
Watkins, M. Teitelbaum, B. Anderson) revealed no agreement among them about the sup-
posed paradigmatic nature of the Project’s research activity. Nevertheless, I do not think 
this poses a serious threat against the perspective suggested here.  
7  Studies in maths, statistics, sociology and economy, rarely in humanistic sciences; member-
ship in Population Association of America, American Sociological Association, Interna-
tional Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Social Science History Association. A 
majority of the Project’s members spend at least some time as research fellows and associ-
ates at Princeton or have been employed at OPR. Some of the most active associates 
(S.C. Watkins, J. Knodel) got their doctorate degrees at Princeton working under the guid-
ance of A.J. Coale. 
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son and Härm 1979; Knodel 1974; Lesthaeghe 1977; Livi Bacci 1971, 1977; 
Teitelbaum 1984; van de Walle 1974)8. 
Furthermore, the members of the Project to a large extent shared a common 
mindset for they agreed upon the following specific issues. First, most of the 
Princeton-related scholars assumed that prior to the onset of fertility decline, 
the practice of family limitation was largely absent. Couples in pretransitional 
societies made no conscious attempt to control the number of births, and the 
probability of a women giving birth was independent of the number of children 
already born, that is – it was parity-independent (Coale 1986: 9-10; comp. 
Coale 1973: 66). The very concept of family limitation was regarded as alien to 
the mentalities of pretransitional couples, while the use of techniques of birth 
control, particularly within marriage, was not only unknown but also “simply 
unthinkable” (Knodel and van de Walle 1979: 219, 227, 229; also Knodel 
1977: 224-227)9. In other words, it was believed that within pretransitional 
settings at least two of the three specific prerequisites for a decline in marital 
fertility listed by Coale were lacking (Coale 1973: 65; Knodel and van de 
Walle 1979: 229)10.  
The shift towards fertility regulation and its subsequent fertility decline re-
sulted from an innovative behavioural change initiated by some segments of 
the population and marked a fundamental break with past patterns of marital 
childbearing (Watkins 1987: 649; Knodel 1988: 455). It took the form of par-
ity-dependent fertility control, which has been known as stopping behaviour. It 
was stopping behaviour rather than lengthening of birth-intervals that was 
considered responsible for precipitating the fall of fertility to modern levels 
(Knodel and van de Walle 1979: 233; Knodel 1987). Such a view of the repro-
ductive mechanism was based on several assumptions which were taken for 
granted despite some members’ recognition of the limited appropriateness of 
the Project’s methods in detecting behaviours different from stopping and 
despite some countervailing evidence being available (Knodel 1977: 241; 
                                                             
8  The works of J.Knodel (1988) and S.Watkins (1991) have been published after completion 
of the Project, but – despite some methodological differences – can be subsumed under the 
rubric of “the Princeton view”. Other important extensions of it: Watkins and Bongaarts 
1996, and Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001. The original stimulous for the Project came 
from Leasure 1962. 
9  The idea of the “unthinkableness” of the fertility control in past populations comes from 
P. Aries’ research on the history of mentality; see Aries 1972: 10 ff.  
10  Pretransitional couples were seen as either “unready” to engage into family limitation (their 
reproduction sphere was not within the calculus of conscious choice) or “unable” to do so 
due to the lack of effective techniques of fertility reduction. It was their willingness to cur-
tail fertility that was believed to be possibleamong them (Knodel and van de Walle 1979: 
229-231; comp. Coale 1967: 208). The “ready, willing and able model” although derived 
from Coale 1973’s paper, has been thoroughly conceptualized much later by Lesthaeghe 
and Vanderhoeft 2001. A seminal English usage of Coale’s model is represented in Wrigley 
1978. 
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Watkins 1986; Lesthaeghe 1992: 11-12)11. Additionally, the Project down-
played the importance of economic and social change (often simply labelled 
as ‘modernisation’) in causing the fertility transition and instead stressed a 
process of ideational change, that is diffusion of innovative behaviours driven 
by similar attitudes and communication networks spread along linguistic, 
religious or ethnic commonalties (Coale 1971: 18; Knodel 1977: 240-247; 
Lesthaeghe 1977; Livi-Bacci 1977: 136-137; Coale and Watkins 1986; also 
Cleland and Wilson 1987). 
The contribution of the Princeton Project to the understanding of European 
demographic past was manifold, as was its impact on many historical demog-
raphers in Europe and the USA. After dismissing the main components of 
transition theory, “the Princeton view” became a new influential orthodoxy 
well grounded in its institutional omnipotence, the Project’s unprecedented 
scale as well as the pervasive agreement of its members about the nature of 
fertility change (Coale and Watkins 1986)12. Although many of the Project’s 
members initially rejected the possibility of finding any grand generalizations 
about the European fertility decline (esp. Coale 1967: 208; also Leasure 1962: 
240), the Project nevertheless established its own “grand theory” based on 
ideational and diffusion explanations. At the end, it prescribed what was to be 
observed and scrutinized, the kind of questions that were supposed to be asked 
and probed for answers in relation to this subject, how these questions were to 
be put, and how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted13.  
For the last two decades since the publication of the Project’s summary vol-
ume, however, this strong intellectual identity has been effectively fragmented 
                                                             
11  Szreter and Garrett 2000: 48-50 present a reasonable account of policy-related issues upon 
which the Project’s focus on parity-dependent forms of fertility control was conditioned. 
12  A comparison of Princeton final statement (Coale and Watkins 1986) with particular mono-
graphs and articles of its members reveals, however, a certain room for subtle differences in 
opinion on several specific topics, particularly after the Project’s completion. See for exam-
ple: Lesthaeghe 1992: 10-15 (on reproductive strategies different than stopping and on the 
inefficiency of the Project method’s to detect them); Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001: 
242-245 (on the misinterpretation of the PEFP findings in terms of “culture versus econom-
ics”); Livi Bacci 1977: 4, 7, 285 (on the variety of predecline fertility behaviours and at-
tempts to control fertility through spacing before the fertility decline); Livi Bacci 1971: 79, 
94, 99 (on the presence of pretransitional fertility control); Watkins 1987: 650-651 (on the 
presence of “the calculus of conscious choice” in the past). Also Anderson 1986: 313 (for a 
critical view of aggregate methods and the need for particularistic explanations). 
13  See Cleland and Wilson 1987: 17-19 on the links between the Princeton findings and the 
theoretical orientation of the World Fertility Survey. The Project’s theoretical and methodo-
logical advances have also become the basis for some subsequent research, such as Norwe-
gian Fertility Project (Oslo, 1980-1983; see Sogner 2003), K. Lockridge’s extensive study 
of fertility transition in Sweden (Lockridge 1983) and Matthiessen’s in Denmark (1985). 
They form a starting point for much of the current historical demographic research on fertil-
ity change (for example, between 1989 and 1998 a quarter of articles in Demography and 
Population Studies dealing with fertility decline in historic Europe used Coale’s indices of 
fertility; see Wetherell 2001: 590). 
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and transformed into antagonistic and often incommensurable discourses on 
what happened to historic fertility. This process is to be investigated now, with 
its three main areas of scientific contention reviewed: (1) about the nature of 
the change in reproductive behaviours; (2) about the determinants of fertility 
change; (3) about the character of the transformation process14.  
The Nature of the Change in Reproductive Behaviours 
(A) How natural was “natural” fertility?  
As for the first issue, it is proper to elaborate the changes that affected one of 
the building blocks of the Princeton view that is the concept of “natural fertil-
ity”. Coale and his associates were quite convinced that much of the premodern 
population of Europe should be considered as practicing “natural fertility” 
(Henry 1961; Coale 1986; also Knodel 1977, 1978). Besides adopting Henry’s 
perspective on the concept, Coale also posited three preconditions for the inci-
dence of fertility control and argued that they were largely absent before the 
secular decline in fertility (Henry 1961; Coale 1973). His scepticism about the 
existence of pretransitional fertility control was not only influenced by Henry’s 
persuasive account but might also have been driven by the results of the early 
demographic surveys of non-European populations (Caldwell and Caldwell 
2003: 202)15. This hegemonic discourse claiming that before the secular fertil-
ity decline historical populations had mostly practised natural fertility seems to 
be have been challenged by the plenty of heterodox approaches.  
As early as the 1960s Carlsson (1966) argued that fertility was probably de-
liberately controlled before the decline of the late 19th century. Almost at the 
same time, Dupaquier and Lachiver (1969) recognized the possibility of ra-
tional limiting of births among both natural fertility and transitional popula-
                                                             
14  The scope of the present essay allows no space to investigate the no less important subject 
of the contention over methodology of detecting couples’ different fertility strategies. See: 
Page 1977; Guinnane, Okun and Trussel 1994; Okun 1994, 1995; Wetherell 2001; Brown 
and Guinnane 2006; Van Bavel 2004. 
15  According to Caldwell and Caldwell 2003: 201-202, the twentieth century demographers – 
and especially early Princeton based OPR scholars – were initially far less sceptical of the 
incidence of pretransitional contraceptive practices (see Notestein’s reception of N.Himes’ 
1936 book in: Stix and Notestein 1940). A. Coale and his associates, however, seemed to be 
influenced by their own – and equally justified – reading of Himes in stressing the pre-
dominance of the desire to control fertility over its actual practice and in promoting the 
technological-diffusionist interpretation (Himes 1936: 421; Coale 1973: 61-62). It is impor-
tant to note that in the Princeton’s orthodoxy variation within natural fertility patterns has 
been considered to be a “relatively unimportant curiosity” rather than the evidence of diver-
sity in reproductive behaviours in the past (see Kodel and van de Walle 1979: 233; Szreter 
and Garrett 2000: 49-50).  
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tions. These initial insights were later confirmed by several other local studies. 
They revealed the presence of fertility control much earlier than originally 
supposed, but not solely confined to groups of mainly urban “forerunners” 
(Wrigley 1966; Gaunt 1973; Levine 1977: 64-67; Andorka 1979; Smith 1987; 
Landers 1990; Vann and Eversley 1992: 136-140; Fauve-Chamoux 1995). 
Even Knodel’s bold statement of little, if any family limitation as practiced in 
rural Germany before the late 19th century fertility decline (Knodel 1978, p. 
483) has been questioned by other German family reconstitution studies. The 
latter clearly revealed a periodic application of fertility control at historical 
periods long before the secular decline (Gehrmann 1984, p. 224 ff; Lee 1977: 
40-51; Benz 1999). More recently David and Mroz (1989a, 1989b), David and 
Sanderson (1986) as well as Santow (1995) have all argued that what must be 
viewed by today’s standards as having been a regime of high marital fertility, 
was not at all the same thing as a regime that left the fertility of marriages 
unregulated. Methods of deliberate birth control (abstinence or coitus interrup-
tus) seem to have been practised long before the beginning of the secular fertil-
ity decline, even without any couples’ intentions to reduce family size (also 
Szreter and Garrett 2000: 52 ff.)16.  
Part of this countervailing evidence presented so far resulted from detailed 
investigation of local contexts that made it possible to uncover what had been 
obscured by the Princeton’s aggregates. Some represented a spirit of economet-
ric sophistication coupled with a dogma of universal human rationality and 
maximizing behaviour extended on human reproduction. However, there was 
also a more distinct tradition of inquiry, markedly different from the Project’s 
assumtions and characterized by an understanding of pretranstional populations 
and agents. From such a methodologically different stance, drawing upon an-
thropological reading of historical literary sources, A. MacLaren questioned 
not only the presupposition of the unthinkableness of fertility control in past 
societies, but also the concept of natural fertility as such (MacLaren 1978, 
1984). Against the Princeton assumptions and evidence (but in line with early 
intuitions of Judith Blake; see Blake 1985), he argued that historical agents 
were not passive with regard to the reproductive sphere, and that there was no 
behavioural revolution behind the dramatic secular fertility decline of late 19th 
century (MacLaren 1984: 87)17. But that was only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, 
Maclaren referred to a much wider anthropological tradition that since the 
                                                             
16  Szreter and Garrett who argued that in pretransitional England reproduction was within the 
realm of the conscious choice were, however, concerned mainly with the widespread prac-
tive of delayed marriages and with the pattern of “starting” behavior. 
17  J. Blake (1985: 394-397) asserted that fertility decline should be seen as an extension of the 
purposive controls over reproduction that existed prior to the fundamental changes of 19th 
century and that the whole process itself had much more of continuity with the past than it 
was supposed. This implied that motives for fertility control existed prior to “moderniza-
tion” whenever fertility has become greater than people wanted at a particular time. Re-
cently, Szreter and Garrett 2000: 48, reached similar conclusions. 
 20
seminal A. Carr-Saunders’ The population problem had claimed that the con-
scious and voluntary regulation of numbers may well have been one of the 
earliest features of human culture (e.g. Carr-Saunders 1922, p. 197 ff.;  
Krzywicki 1934; Polgar 1971a, 1971b; Cashdan 1985; also Himes 1936). That 
even without access to modern contraception people took steps to limit their 
family sizes is a view now fairly widespread in recent anthropological works 
(Greenhalgh 1995b: 15; Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Caldwell 2004)18.  
(B) Starting, stopping, spacing 
Another aspect of the hegemonic tradition confined to fertility strategies has 
been challenged even more, involving a revision to existing scientific beliefs 
and practices. Against the theoretical suppositions of Princeton Project, some 
other scholars have found the lengthening of birth intervals a more realistic 
portrayal of decision-making process within past societies than reliance on 
parity-dependent fertility control. To them, what was a far more widespread 
motivation for contraceptive use than just a simple desire to limit family size, 
was an intention to ensure that births do not come too close together, especially 
given the imperfect techniques of contraception. Serious doubts have also been 
expressed about any a priori theoretical reasons for counting parity-
independent fertility control as “natural” and thereby excluding it from the 
category of controlled fertility (Cashdan 1985; Landers 1990: 96-100, 107; 
recently, Van Bavel and Kok 2004: 120)19. In consequence, during the last two 
decades the role of “spacing” as a family building strategy in pre-transition and 
transition societies went to the heart of the crucial debates on the character of 
reproductive behaviours and demographic change. This unfinished and con-
tinuing battle (see Van Bavel and Kok 2004; Bengtsson and Dribe 2006) has 
already brought about the dissolution of several building bocks of the Princeton 
scientific tradition. 
Again, the provenance of revisionists may have varied significantly. Some 
were driven by the need to equip existing historic demographical studies with 
statistical methods considerably more refined for discerning birth spacing be-
haviours as elements within more complex strategies of family limitation (Alter 
1988: 163-195; David, Mroz and Wachter 1985; David and Mroz 1989a, 
                                                             
18  However, there is no agreement on that issue even among mainstream anthropologists. See 
for example: Handwerker 1983. J.C. Caldwell (2004) restricted his tentative assertion of 
fertility control in Ancient Rome to the sectional fertility decline among Roman upper-
classes.  
19  Implicit in the Princeton’s view was the assumption that the entry of rationality into the 
sphere of reproduction required couples’ conscious calculations and their anticipation of 
long-range benefits from an attempted (desired) family size; Knodel 1977: 241. Later on, 
Knodel (1988: 318-319) attempted to explain the Project’s heavy focus on stopping at the 
expense of spacing by “the greater ease with which deliberate stopping can be detected 
compared to deliberate spacing”. 
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1989b; Okun 1995; Ewbank 1989; van Bavel 2004). Other have reified an 
older assumption of Kingsley Davis that fertility has always responded to the 
environmental context (Davis 1963). Those adduced evidence of deliberate 
non-parity specific fertility control before the fertility transition, which re-
sponded to particular social, economic and demographic factors in order to 
maintain a target living standard, rather then an ideal family size (Weir 1983: 
136 ff.; Anderton and Bean 1985; Gehrmann 1984; David and Mroz 1989a, 
1989b; Landers 1990: 106 ff.; van Bavel 2003; 2004b; Bengtsson and Dribe 
2002, 2006).  
Some scholars, however, went even further. One of D. Anderton and his col-
leagues from the so-called Utah project’s achievements was the unambiguous 
identification of birth spacing behaviours within Mormon population both 
before and during the transition phase of fertility decline. Of much greater 
substantive novelty were two other conclusions they reached. One posited that 
a conscious spacing strategy could well have been used to achieve smaller 
families, and therefore was a parity independent family building strategy not 
necessary. The other one drew on evidence that the general transition process 
could well have been associated with an increase in deliberate spacing practices 
within a population, and rejected the assumption that stopping was the only 
powerful factor in fertility transition (Anderton and Bean 1985; also Szreter 
and Garrett 2000). Finally, the authors felt comfortable enough with asserting 
that prior to the initiation of the secular fertility decline the concept of natural 
or uncontrolled fertility could be applicable only at the aggregate level, and that 
within such pretransitional populations subgroups composed of couples limit-
ing family size may be identified (Anderton and Bean 1985: 180-181; also 
Landers 1990: 100). 
In the study of class differentials in fertility in England and Wales, 
S. Szreter reached similar conclusions (1996: 377-382). He showed that both 
spacing and stopping may have been applied at different phases by women 
during their reproductive years, as they were not mutually exclusive family 
building strategies (p. 381, 433). He also presented comprehensive evidence in 
favour of spacing rather than stopping as “the typical, primary method of birth 
control throughout English society during its initial stages of falling fertility” 
(p. 382). Counter to the foundations of Princeton’s paradigm, he concluded that 
“(…) stopping did not necessarily play a leading role as the principal strategy 
of fertility regulation (…), but may have been more associated with a later 
stage of the process” (p. 389)20.  
This evidence cast question on the Princeton Project’s conclusion about the 
very nature of premodern and transition fertility behaviours (Knodel and van de 
Walle 1979). Far more, studies of spacing and stopping have inevitably led to 
                                                             
20  Again, wider generalizations in other societies which replicate these findings may be hard 
to prove. For the countervailing evidence from three Baden villages see Benz (1999). 
 22
the posing of more complex questions about premodern and transition family 
building strategies. It was within this area that further challenges to the hege-
monic discourse have appeared and the new methodological ambiguities and 
inconsistencies within its confines have been revealed.  
For example, the Princeton Project’s assertion that the diffusion and legiti-
mation of innovative birth control techniques played a crucial role in the fertil-
ity decline (van de Walle 1980, 1992: 488 ff.) has come under attack. Again, 
Szreter’s research was among the most path-breaking in this regard (Szreter 
1996: 398 ff.). According to him, mass contraception did not play a central role 
during the initial period of falling fertility in Britain between 1860 and 1914. 
The only behavioural and cultural innovation that accounts for the early stages 
of the decline lay in the extension of long-established practice of attempted 
sexual abstinence among young married adults (p. 398). Szreter was also not 
convinced about a clear and deliberate purpose and a conscious intention be-
hind this behavioural change (p. 414). By assuming that the practice of absti-
nence could have easily taken the form of withdrawal, Szreter reiterated the 
older ideas of MacLaren who had argued that coitus interruptus was the princi-
pal method of birth control used before appliance methods became more wide-
spread (p. 420). Furthermore, by treating the couples’ power relations as the 
main determinant of the existence of effective birth spacing, not surprisingly, 
Szreter gave stimulus to new lines of inquiry (Szreter 1999; Fisher and Szreter 
2003; Szreter, Nye, and van Poppel 2003). 
By using oral testimonies of a hundred English men and women from work-
ing-class districts of Oxford and South Wales practicing some form of contra-
ception during the end period of English fertility decline, K. Fisher strength-
ened Szreter’s arguments. She argued that all of Coale’s three seminal 
prerequisites for fertility decline were actually not necessary for successful and 
systematic birth control (Fisher 2000; Fisher and Szreter 2003). Within the 
studied sample attempts to reduce fertility took place quite apart from the 
spread of modern contraceptive technology and rested almost exclusively on 
traditional methods of withdrawal. Moreover, couples attempting to curtail 
their fertility did so without having firm or specific views on the precise num-
ber or spacing of children desired (Fisher 2000: 300; Fisher and Szreter 2003: 
274-276). What’s more, even their motivation for fertility control seemed to be 
ambivalent: much of the revealed contraceptive strategies seemed to be un-
planned, while substantial numbers of respondents acted unthinkingly with 
regard to fertility choices (Fisher and Szreter 2003, p. 276)21. In other words, 
the mentality of those who were capable of controlling the size of their families 
was much closer to what (according to Princeton standards) would be termed as 
“pretransitional” or “traditional” (Landers 1990: 96-100). Finally, in Fisher’s 
account, Coale’s influential model is considered as a mere simplification that 
                                                             
21  Similar arguments have been made in Seccombe 1990: 161-171. 
 23
distorts the actual complexity of the dynamics of family decision-making 
(Fisher 2000: 299 ff.). 
The Determinants of Fertility Change:  
Culture versus Economics 
The issue of the determinants of fertility decline mark another area of the con-
tention concerning the Princeton view and the one in which a clash of counter-
vailing evidence and divergent discourses can be observed. In the works of the 
Princeton-related scholars the classic demographic and socio-economic vari-
ables such as urbanization, literacy, infant and child mortality, and industriali-
zation failed to account for the fertility transition. Accordingly, demographers 
associated with the Project called attention to regional-cultural and diffusion 
explanations (Knodel and van de Walle 1979)22. Recently, however, the agree-
ment on the Princeton conclusions appears much more flawed than it seemed to 
be at the time of the summary volume’s publication. In what follows I draw on 
this countervailing evidence23. 
At the early beginnings of the Princeton research, Carlsson presented con-
trasting view of the changes in fertility as reflecting couples’ adaptation to 
changing economic and social circumstances (Carlsson 1966). However, it was 
Toni Richards who for the first time attempted to employ refined statistical 
models to test the Project’s conclusions (Richards 1977). Richards’ research 
has considerably shifted the interpretation of Princeton’s data by showing that 
cross-sectional variance in the temporal aspects of the German fertility transi-
tion can be explained fairly well through structural change alone (Richards 
1977: 546). Specifically, it demonstrated important impact, increasing over 
time, of industrial structure on the German experience of falling fertility 
(p. 548, 552). 
Some recent studies have come to similar conclusions. The University of 
California Prussian Project, based on German aggregate data of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, concluded that cultural variables were not important 
determinants of the rate of fertility decline within Prussian counties. The latter 
was determined to a greater extent by structural and economic variables than by 
cultural ones (Galloway, Hammel and Lee 1994). Similarly, a recent economet-
ric analysis of the fertility decline within Bavarian counties and districts 
                                                             
22  More nuanced view on that topic present Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986; Lesthaeghe 1992.  
23  Some scholars have argued that the lively “culture versus economics” debate within fertility 
studies is flawed. Not only, it is argued, it essentially misinterpretes PEFP findings, but also 
the whole problem is wrongly posed (see Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001: 242; Burch 
1996: 65 ff.). Since my goal is essentially to assess the discrepancies within existing dis-
courses rather than to validate the claims or theoretical stances of particular camps against 
each other, this problem is not considered here. 
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(Brown and Guinnane 2001) has also nuanced the Princeton’s findings. It re-
vealed a small but clear role of economic and social change in the region’s 
fertility history by making clear those areas which had increasing opportunities 
for women had the most rapid fertility decline. Several other ambiguities in the 
fertility decline when compared to Princeton’s strong emphasis on cultural 
variables have emerged due to these authors’ exploration of the rich micro-
level data for the city of Munich (Brown and Guinnane 2005)24. 
Additionally, G. Hammel in his study of demographic behaviour in the 
Northwest Balkans revealed a commonality of demographic trends across 
major cultural and linguistic differences, but demographic differences within a 
much more closely defined cultural commonality, and argued that all were 
associated with economic and political factors (Hammel 1995)25. Last, but not 
least, M. Haines (1979), A. Hinde (1990: 78 ff) and S. Szreter (1996: 319) – 
albeit from different methodological positions – have claimed that a localized, 
complex interaction of demographic, economic and social factors shaped fertil-
ity differentials among different subpopulations of particular communities. 
That was also the case in the Italian community of Cassalecchio, where Kertzer 
and Hogan (1989) found not only a clear relationship between the type of 
household economy and the timing of the fertility decline among different 
subsets of the population, but also some indication of fertility behaviours rela-
tively independent of processes of cultural change (p. 148, 163-170, 176-178).  
However, the actual role of cultural factors in the European experience of 
declining fertility seems to be far from solved. It seems that the next round of 
the match between Economy and Culture has already been initiated. On the one 
hand, the introduction of less mechanistic approaches to economic and cultural 
explanations of reproduction within the so-called political economy of fertility 
moves us further away from the once uniform discourse of the hegemonic 
tradition. On the other hand, it reifies the role of cultural factors and mecha-
nisms that were present but poorly defined within the works of the Princeton 
demographers (Greenhalgh 1990; Kertzer and Hogan 1989: 152; Kertzer 1995). 
Here, I refer to two representative studies.  
A study of reproductive change in the Sicilian town of Villamura showed 
that socio-economic and cultural differences could have operated together in 
accounting for the fertility decline. The Schneiders explain sharp differentials 
in the timing of the fertility decline in Villamura in terms of socio-economic 
                                                             
24  A small but evident fertility control among Catholics; strong income correlation with the 
propensity to fertility control. 
25  In my perception, differences between these researches and the Princeton’s view cannot be 
attributed solely to differences in the statistical models applied or to the reduction of scale. 
In this regard rejection of Princeton’s conclusions could have also had a disciplinary reason 
for almost all of the scholars discussed here came from within a similar economic tent and 
may well have shared an opinion that rejection of economic causation in fertility decline is 
“contrary both to intuition and to theoretical expectation” (University of California Prussian 
Project Report, p. 1, <http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/prussia/prussia.report.pdf>). 
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differences between different class-groups and the ways they responded to 
changing macroeconomic and political factors. However, they also believe that 
among all the groups they studied the fertility decline could have occurred 
through distinct cultural propensities that facilitated the adoption of birth con-
trol at different points in time (Schneider and Schneider 1992). Neither “clas-
sism”, nor “culturalism” – the Schneiders argue – can properly explain the 
changes in agents’ reproductive behaviours (Schneider and Schneider 1996: 
191 ff; 1998: 179)26. 
Similarly, with explicit reference to Princeton’s approach, M. Segalen in her 
study of two examples of the late French fertility decline has pointed out that 
the advent of birth control must be studied in terms of local cultures as they are 
embedded in close-knit communities with the whole complexity of their institu-
tional arrangements (Segalen 1992). In Segalen’s approach, it is culture as 
anchored in particular forms of domestic organization and inheritance patterns 
that mediates between economic forces and couples’ immediate reproductive 
decisions27. 
Even without referring to such multilayered and interdisciplinary research 
other indications of the subtle play of cultural factors in fertility decline can be 
detected outside the Princeton circle. Bardet and Dupaquier, for example, in 
seeking to explain how and why the transition in France preceded similar de-
velopments in other European countries, have put forward a hypothesis of 
Parisian influence on peasant cultures. By stressing the role of the various 
contraceptive methods used, the authors emphasized cultural rather than socio-
economic explanations for the fertility decline and argued that both birth con-
trol and the French Revolution were products of cultural changes (Bardet and 
Dupâquier 1986; also Chesnais 1992: 333-338). From a different geographical 
milieu, M. Gutmann in his study of the fertility decline of German-Americans 
in 19th-century Texas (Gutmann and Fliess 1993) found striking fertility dif-
ferentials between Catholics and Protestants. According to Gutmann, they 
incorporated differences in both religion and secularisation, and were important 
forces affecting both the timing of fertility decline and overall levels of fertility 
within the subsets of population. Furthermore, Gutmann’s multivariate analysis 
demonstrated the significance in fertility decline of other cultural variables 
such as ethnicity and language spoken, although not independently of socio-
economic ones. 
The last study which should be mentioned here is a path-breaking investiga-
tion into fertility change in central rural Sweden (Lockridge 1983). In his at-
tempt to explain the early and simultaneous signs of family limitation in three 
                                                             
26  Concurrently, Schneiders (Schneider and Schneider 1992: 148; 1996: 9) made a significant 
attempt to reject the diffusion hypothesis in a form it took in the writings of Princeton re-
lated scholars while substituting it with the subtler view of cultural dynamics. 
27  A.W. Carus and S. Ogilvie (Carus and Ogilvie, forthcoming) have recently provided a large 
number of research examples carried out using similar methodological framework. 
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localities, Lockridge stressed that they seemed to share no common social or 
demographic structure (p. 48-54). Rather than this, they shared a relatively 
secularised cultural climate (p. 58-59). Finally, he went so far as to argue that 
cultural change was the only universal and necessary local precondition for the 
fertility transition (p. 68). 
Transition or Transitions? The Character of the  
Transformation Process 
The last controversy to be discussed here is no less troublesome for the once 
dominant view of the transition process. It is within this area that the theoretical 
incommensurability of the rivalry and opposite discourses often becomes ap-
parent as severe incoherencies in the very portrait of the past demographic 
processes begin to emerge.  
According to European Fertility Project the fertility transitions in all Euro-
pean countries (with the exception of France, Ireland and Albania) began at 
nearly the same time and had the feature of an apparent simultaneity. They 
were sudden, sustained, and monotonic; their diffusion was pandemic and 
irreversible. After the first appearance of family limitation in an area, it in-
fected different subsets of population, populations and national societies almost 
instantly (Knodel and van de Walle 1979: 234-235). Several pieces of counter-
vailing evidence make such a perspective on the transition process untenable28. 
One of the first intuitive insights into the compositional nature of the general 
fertility decline comes from M. Haines’ research on fertility in mining commu-
nities. Haines’ initial exploration of occupational fertility differentials in the 
industrializing environment of Prussian Upper Silesia led him to argue that the 
pattern and speed of a particular transition process may depend to a large extent 
on the occupational structure of a given population. That was so because par-
ticular occupations were usually bound with peculiar residence patterns, earn-
ing possibilities, extent of women’s labour market participation, nuptiality and 
mortality regimes, and patterns of conjugal relations – all affecting fertility 
outcomes (Haines 1979). In other words, the general methodological conclu-
sion from Haines’ research would be that that proper understanding of the 
nature of the fertility decline requires decomposition of aggregate trends. It was 
only behind these aggregates that Haines was convinced it was possible to 
observe the subtle and complex interplay of local economic and ecological 
                                                             
28  In addition to what follows, it has been demonstrated that the Project’s methodology was 
ineffective in detecting properly the early signs of family limitation and fertility decline in 
general (Guinnane, Okun and Trussel 1994; Brown and Guinnane 2006). The most severe 
criticism of the Princeton’s methodology has been presented by B.S. Okun (1992) who ar-
gued that the Project’s key empirical findings with regard to fertility control may be invalid 
as based on inefficient estimation techniques (see e.g. p. 60, 89, 189-190). 
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factors affecting fertility strategies of particular sub-sets of population. There-
fore, one of the lessons from Haines’ research – even if unintended by himself 
– was one that suggested multiple paths rather than an uniformity in fertility 
declines29.  
A. Hinde (1990) made a similar point with regard to the prominent regional 
differences in fertility among rural communities of late nineteenth-century 
England. According to Hinde these were dissimilarities in households dynam-
ics caused by contrasting work patterns between north-west and south-east 
communities which were responsible not only for dissimilarity of their fertility 
levels but also for the different timing of the onset of conscious attempts to 
curtail marital fertility (Hinde 1990: 78). Although the evidence he presented 
revealed a parallel decline of fertility across the whole sample it was inconclu-
sive on the contemporaneity of the appearance of the voluntary birth control (p. 
89). 
Another countervailing example comes from Szreter’s Fertility, class and 
gender in Britain (1996). Armed with the compositional perspective he advo-
cated, Szreter argued that researchers should be sensitive to demographic di-
vergences within aggregate national trends. Thus, the microscopic analysis of 
fertility differentials among 195 occupational categories from the English 1911 
“fertility census” led him to conclude there were not one but many fertility 
declines occurring in England and Wales during the transition period (p. 310). 
Fascinated by the richness of the historical details Szreter concentrated not so 
much on central tendencies in observed fertility levels and trends but rather on 
their variations, which he discerned even within the most closely defined occu-
pational categories. Among the working classes Szreter distinguished more 
then twenty distinct fertility regimes based around particular industrial sectors, 
each having distinct local work relations and practices (p. 362-364). According 
to Szreter, this manifest difference in strategies of family planning is strong 
testimony against the diffusion of a single new norm or the operation of a sin-
gle process during the fertility decline in England and Wales (p. 345-346). The 
latter view, he asserted, should be replaced by “the picture of many geographi-
cally and chronologically disparate processes occurring in distinct contexts and 
for different reasons” (p. 364). For Szreter, the fertility decline in the sense 
ascribed to it by the Princeton Project was nothing more than an artefact cre-
ated by aggregation (ibid.)30. 
                                                             
29  Haines, however, was prone to arguing for cross national regularities in occupational fertil-
ity differentials (Haines 1979: 247-248). 
30  In his explanation of fertility differentials, Szreter developed the concept of a “communica-
tion community”. According to Szreter, it was groups sharing the same “language” – in 
terms of the expected responsibilities and roles of a mother, father, child – which shared the 
same set of fertility and nuptiality patterns and that this resulted in a diversity not only of 
fertility, but also sexuality regimes. See Szreter 1996: 362-363, 546-558. 
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Eilidh Garrett, Alice Reid, Kevin Schürer and Simon Szreter, in their 
Changing family size in England and Wales (Garrett et.al 2001) pushed that 
argument further. Using the data from the 1891-1919 censuses of England and 
Wales they also demonstrated evidence in favor of “multiple fertility declines 
rather than the unitary diffusion process” (p. 14). Contrary to all the traditional 
assumptions concerning the transition process in England, the authors con-
tended that between 1891 and 1911 there were distinct local demographic 
regimes throughout the country in which the process of fertility decline took 
distinct forms. Among the factors responsible for that mosaic of unique demo-
graphic changes in England and Wales a “community-level characteristics” – 
that is specificity of local work culture, patterns of social interactions and gen-
der division of local labor markets – were of prime importance. According to 
these authors, what has often been termed the English fertility transition actu-
ally consisted of myriads of unique transformations at the local level (p. 322). 
The collected volume edited by Gillis, Tilly and Levine (1992) reached 
comparable conclusions, although derived from a different methodological and 
theoretical orientation. In the introductory chapter to the book, which is often 
treated as historians’ response to purely demographic explanations of the fertil-
ity decline, aggregative and macro-structural approaches are criticized in fa-
vour of traditional forms of historical narrative, qualitative modes of explana-
tion, perspectives from below, and sensitivity to the characteristics of local 
contexts. Consequently, the editors attempt to “offer no grand theory about 
why Europe started to limit births so uniformly”, but instead sought to design 
their research in a way allowing to reveal “the many patterns subsumed in the 
overall decline” (p. 4). The way the fertility revolution was not one but many 
stories impinged on “cultures of contraception” specific to place and time (p. 5) 
is illustrated by several essays throughout the volume31.  
Conclusion: the Generalization that Remains 
This essay has attempted to review the changes that have occurred in ap-
proaches to the historical fertility decline. Historical demographic studies of 
fertility – once relatively homogeneous and unified around the set of leading 
principles, transparent and easily recognized and accepted by most of the prac-
titioners in the field – have been gradually transformed into antagonistic and 
often incompatible discourses. Although in presenting the growing body of 
evidence from older and newer research we have been dealing with apparently 
different aspects of the demographic transition process, they all had one thing 
in common: they represented an ever-growing list of “counter-examples” or 
“exceptions” to previously adhered-to scientific tradition of the European 
                                                             
31  See especially the chapters by Gillis, Seccombe, Schneiders and Segalen. 
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Princeton Fertility Project. How puzzling and fuzzy is the knowledge stemming 
from the forty years of research into historical fertility decline can be seen in 
tackling several significant problems. Did past populations deliberately control 
their fertility or should we rather think of this practice as largely absent before 
the revolutionary changes of the late 19th century? Did the change in couples’ 
reproductive behaviours implied a mental revolution, the emergence of new 
concerns about the offspring and innovative fertility techniques? Or, was it 
perhaps rather an adjustment process that had its roots in practices that were as 
old as the history of man? Was the fertility decline driven by socio-economic 
forces, or alternative by cultural ones, or perhaps by both? Was there any 
common European experience of “the fertility decline”, an unitary process of 
demographic change? Or should we instead speak of multiple fertility declines 
occurring in distinct contexts and for different reasons?  
The current knowledge of these topics makes it impossible to give a conclu-
sive answer to any of these questions. The trend toward scepticism about the 
Princeton’s vision of European experience of declining fertility and toward the 
latter’s particularistic explanations may well represent a new promising path of 
research. Nevertheless, I would argue, it finally leaves the reader – especially 
the one sympathetic to social sciences – hard pressed to find any possible gen-
eralization. In this regard the forty years of research on the historical fertility 
decline has made a rather moderate achievement. As early as 1962, in the con-
cluding chapters of his seminal doctoral dissertation, W. Leasure stated that 
“the above analysis seems to indicate that there is no simple explanation for 
differential fertility in Spain. The attitudes towards family size are undoubtedly 
the result of a very complex inter-relationship of variables (...)” and that “it is 
doubtful whether the relationship will ever be known in any precise way” 
(Leasure 1962: 220, 240). A. Coale reiterated this argument in the early stage 
of Princeton Project by asserting that fertility reduction “cannot yet be ex-
plained by any simple, universally valid model or generalized description” 
(Coale 1967: 208). From the perspective of the beginning of the 21st century, 
then, it may appear that the notion of demographic and reproductive heteroge-
neity is the only generalization that remains (see McDonald 2001: 2). Putting it 
differently, it might be said that the ongoing accumulation of detailed demo-
graphic knowledge seems rather like a blind alley. Actually, one may argue that 
the more we know about the past the less we can say about it, at least in terms 
of a single comprehensive and coherent “grand narrative” (see Greenhalgh 
1990: 85). 
But is this something that can satisfy historical demographers and demogra-
phers of the new millenium? Are they facing a cascade of new and intriguing 
research findings that foreshadow new and promising avenues of investigation 
which may ultimately lead to more comprehensive theories built upon cumula-
tive and conceptually integrative frameworks? Or are they perhaps confronted 
with anomalies in the previously dominant research program which make it 
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thoroughly inconsistent with observed facts and which prompt them to abandon 
it entirely in favour of a new more progressive one?32 Again, opinions are 
polarized. 
Drawing upon Lakatos’ perspective on the growth of scientific knowledge, 
R. Lesthaeghe has recently revitalized the supposedly devaluated Princeton 
view (Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001; Lesthaeghe 1998). Focusing exclu-
sively on Coale’s formulation of the preconditions for a fertility decline 
(somewhat underestimated in the literature, as he argues), Lesthaeghe indicated 
that – if properly formalized in mathematical and statistical terms – Coale’s 
model can serve as a framework for the integration of dispersed and divergent 
discourses on fertility (Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001: 241). According to 
Lesthaeghe, this type of model is able to depict the diverse demographic ex-
periences of different populations (2001: 262-263) and hence to integrate sup-
posedly mutually exclusive explanations of fertility phenomena. It is also capa-
ble of predicting new facts and new hypotheses. No overarching theory of 
reproductive behaviors would be achieved this way, but rather a “multicausal 
configuration based on empirically [and contextually] grounded complemen-
tary explanations” (Lesthaeghe 1998: 12). 
Such a “liberalized” view of demographic models is also suggested by 
T. Burch (2001, 2003). Defending the theoretical achievements of demography, 
he has argued for a redefinition of the meaning of a theory itself and its appli-
cation in demographic research. Referring to what he called a “semantic 
school” of philosophy of science Burch posited that all theories should be 
treated as abstract representations of some portion of the real world with the 
clear understanding that they are always partial and approximate representa-
tions of its infinitely complex nature. In this view, the real question is not 
whether a theory or a model fits (or predicts) all particular cases from empirical 
reality, but rather how well it fits the intended aspects of the real world, that is 
whether the approximation of the model is ‘good enough” (Burch 2003: 264, 
267). Within such a perspective, the Princeton view of the historical fertility 
change would still retain some validity and could work as a convenient partial 
generalization and a useful framework for further research. This holds true 
especially as it seems questionable – Burch argues – to reject explanations 
framed at a larger level of analysis solely because they cannot explain variation 
and change at low levels of aggregation (Burch 1996: 65).  
The departure from “grand narratives” in the explanation of fertility changes 
is also reflected in P. McDonald’s recent contribution (McDonald 2001). Ac-
cording to this Australian demographer, the vast variation in the economies, 
cultures, social and political structures of different societies makes the search 
for a universal theory of fertility change a fruitless excercise (p. 2). In order to 
                                                             
32  This distinction roughly corresponds with I. Lakatos’ notion of progressive and degenera-
tive research programs, and correspondingly with progressive and degenerative problem 
shift. See Lakatos 1970. 
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concentrate its research efforts on profitable approaches, demography should 
turn away from attempts to propose a grand theory that is applicable to all 
circumstances and instead make a way to the equivalent of Merton’s middle-
range theories (Merton 1968). “The generalized theoretical frameworks” sug-
gested by McDonald may serve to discover and explain distinct but related 
dimensions of the fertility change, but with an appreciation of their particular 
social, economic and institutional contexts. 
Microeconomic, multicausal models of fertility may also be of some help in 
this regard. For example, the Easterlin’s theory of fertility decline has the ad-
vantage of dealing both with supply and demand of children, as well as with 
broadly defined costs of fertility regulation. It also allows thorough operation-
alization of the wide range of “intermediate fertility variables”, while making 
possible an eventual inclusion of social, psychological and cultural factors in 
the model at the same time (Easterlin 1975; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). Rao 
has recently called with regard to demography for formal quantitative models 
of human action and agency, which would be anthropologically and locally 
informed. Such economic models of demographic behavior could be more 
successfull than purely demographic ones in incorporating the locally and 
culturally dependent issues of incentives, motives, symbolism and power rela-
tions, but would deal with them in terms of mathematical functions and model-
ling (Rao 1997). 
Other works have moved in other direction. Wilson and Airey (1999) have 
recently argued for the restatement of the “big picture” again and called for a 
much more generalised version of the demographic transition theory. Drawing 
upon the homeostatic perspective, they suggested to view the fertility decline 
just as an episode in the very long-run process at work – the one in which peri-
ods of sustained population growth are normally followed by periods of sus-
tained decline whenever population and resources get ‘out of balance’, in a 
constant attempt to produce an overall pattern of low growth. In this approach, 
the geographical, historical and cultural differences in populations’ demo-
graphic responses are conceptualized within a wider model of the interaction 
between population and economic growth over the past two millenia. 
What is common to the perspectives presented so far is the assumption that 
the theory (or model) is an advisable, if not a neccessary, precondition for a 
fruitful examination of empirical data. Some other scholars, however, have 
argued for a different methodological approach. Discussing the prospects of 
fertility research, Szreter (1993) contented that it “(...) needs emancipation 
from the dominance of the abstract ideas of ‘demographic’ or ‘fertility’ transi-
tion and the associated, too exclusive deference to the covering laws methodol-
ogy”. Instead, he called for “(...) an accumulation of patient, carefully contex-
tualized, investigative projects on fertility change in specific communities, 
where the form that fertility change takes is not judged in advance... Only such 
studies as these can do justice to the variety of changing fertility behaviours in 
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any community and can examine the ways in which economic and political 
forces of change are mediated by local, cultural, and institutional forms...” 
(1993: 692)33.  
The problem is that these divergent propositions may be accepted to a dif-
ferent degree and in a variety of ways by the members of different disciplinary 
cultures34. There is no doubt that among the opponents of the Princeton view to 
whom I referred in earlier paragraphs, significant differences in epistemologi-
cal orientation exist and may play a decisive role in choosing further research 
directions. While both the members of the European Fertility Project, and 
David’s, Anderton’s, Galloway’s and Guinnane’s research teams may be con-
sidered as adherents of social science methodology (with a strong inclination 
toward quantification, statistical modelling and hypotheses testing), the others 
take conspiciously different positions. Szreter, for example, describing his 
collaborative project with Fisher, referred to “inductive, anthropological, and 
historical research”, “highly qualitative and closely allied to anthropology”, 
and “more ethnographic and microcosmic look” (Szreter, Nye and van Poppel 
2003: 152-153)35. 
This diversity of epistemological outlook among the critics of the Princeton 
scientific tradition may pose certain limits on cross-disciplinary transfers of 
methods and modes of explanation among them and further increase the exist-
ing proliferation of discourses. If historians and anthropologists take further 
steps in inventing their own versions of demographic studies36, then a further 
shift toward particularistic explanations will become inevitable, and the further 
we will move from the chance of reaching a general methodological consensus. 
What we would then witness would be hundreds of monographs telling hun-
dreds of different and separate stories about how fertility changed. It remains 
an open question whether these divergent discourses are likely to be integrated 
again into a new, unified and coherent methodological strain of research. Per-
sonally, I doubt it. The proliferation of discourses will likely become the most 
                                                             
33  However, in a general accordance with Szreter’s account, S. Greenhalgh did not bar the 
possibility of attaining some level of generalized knowledge when she wrote that “once 
enough cases are collected and understood, they might serve as building blocks of more 
general understandings of reproductive dynamics” (Greenhalgh 1995b: 17).  
34  The problem of “disciplinary culture” in relation to demographic studies of fertility has 
been introduced by S. Greenhalgh (1997). See also Riley and McCarthy 2003.  
35  In his recent collaborative project, Szreter referred to the “critical reflexive demography”. 
See Szreter, Sholkamy and Dharmalingam 2004. 
36  Among historians, it was the recognition that “demography is too important to be left to the 
demographers” that gave a strong stimulus toward their increasing interest in fertility revo-
lution (Gillis, Tilly and Levine 1992: 3). Within the field of anthropological demography, 
Greenhalgh called for “not to reinvent the field of demography, but to create a different 
kind of demography, one better suited to the anthropological enterprise” (Greenhalgh 
1995a: xiv). Riley and McCarthy (2003) have recently introduced a postmodernist project 
of demography. 
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serious threat to the disciplinary identity of the future historical demographic 
studies of fertility37. 
Meanwhile, an admiration for the discrete charm of diversity in the past 
demographic landscape and in all the narratives about it may continue to be a 
most absorbing enterprise. It also allows us to relinquish an idea that there was 
a time when science was to discover the principles that explain complex pat-
terns of reality. 
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